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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a modern society heavily dependent on computers,1 the Internet is quickly 
becoming a part of everyday life in the United States and around the world.2  It is 
                                                                
1See, e.g., John Pike, FAS Cyberstrategy Project: CyberStats (last modified Oct. 16, 1997) 
<http://www.fas.org/cp/netstats.htm> (“By the end of this decade, the number of households 
with home computers may surpass the number with cable television.”).  
2Statistics on Internet use vary greatly, but it is undeniable that the number of Internet 
users is growing at a tremendous rate.  See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 
F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (200 million users worldwide by 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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attracting the masses for a number of reasons, but largely because its services are 
convenient, fast, and relatively cheap.3  Many activities that were once carried out in 
person, by telephone, or by traditional mail are now taking place on this vast 
computer network. 
While new technologies may bring convenience and cost savings to the public, 
they also bring challenges to established legal principles.  Courts are just beginning 
to struggle with some of the unique legal questions that the Internet has created.4  In 
recent years, the legal system has wrestled with such issues as how Internet contacts 
establish personal jurisdiction5 and how much Fourth Amendment protection is 
afforded an e-mail message.6  And as the Internet becomes further established as a 
staple of American society, many more legal questions are certain to arise. 
One such question will likely involve the due process implications of sending 
notice in a class action lawsuit by e-mail.  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which governs class actions, requires notice of “opt out” rights in a Rule 
23(b)(3) class, including individual notice to identifiable members of the class.7  
Traditionally, individual notice in (b)(3) class actions has been given by first-class 
mail,8 up until now the most convenient and inexpensive form of individual notice in 
most class actions.  But notice by traditional mail may soon be a thing of the past, 
replaced by e-mail notice over the Internet.  As more attorneys recognize the benefits 
                                                          
1999); Computer Industry Almanac Inc.: Over 300 Million Internet Users in Year 2000 
(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.c-i-a.com/199809iu.htm> (over 327 million users world 
wide by year-end 2000, up from 100 million by year-end 1997); Emerge Inc.: What’s New 
(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.emergeinc.com.statistics.html> (estimating 1 billion 
internet users worldwide by 2001); Nua Internet: How Many Online (visited Mar. 29, 1999) 
<http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html> (151 million users worldwide as 
of December 1998).  See also Kelly M. Slavitt, Gabby in Wonderland - Through the Internet 
Looking Glass, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 612 (1998) (citing various statistics 
on the growth of Internet use); Scott A. Sundstrom, You’ve Got Mail! (And the Government 
Knows It): Applying the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-Mail Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 2064, 2064 (1998) (compiling statistics on internet use). 
3See Leonard I. Frieling, Making E-Mail Mean Effective Mail, 26 COLO. LAW 121, 121 
(1997) (“E-mail is rapidly becoming an integral part of professional and personal lives.  It is 
almost free, quite reliable, very fast, and works, unlike telephones, on the individual schedules 
of the writer and reader.”); Jeff Goodell, E-Mail, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 27, 1997, at 66 (“[E-
mail is] [t]he best form of communication ever invented—fast, cheap, silent, and personal.”). 
4See, e.g., Compuserve Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 
1997) (whether unsolicited e-mail advertisements are a form of trespass); Cyber Promotions, 
Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (whether the right to send 
unsolicited e-mail advertisements is protected by the First Amendment).  
5See Christopher E. Friel, Downloading a Defendant: Is Categorizing Internet Contacts a 
Departure from the Minimum Contacts Test?, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 293 (1998) (how 
internet contacts establish personal jurisdiction). 
6See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (evaluating the scope of 
privacy afforded an e-mail message under the Fourth Amendment).  
7FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2). 
8431 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
PRACTICE, 7 CLASS ACTION CONTROVERSIES 277 (1992). 
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of conducting business on-line,9 attorneys practicing in class action litigation will be 
particularly attracted to the convenience and cost savings that notice by e-mail 
affords over “snail” mail.10  While it will take a few years before e-mail notice 
becomes a popular option, at least one class action, Fine v. America Online Inc., has 
already utilized e-mail to serve notice.11 
But like the other Internet activities that courts have struggled to reconcile with 
established legal principles, e-mail notice must be reconciled with the principles of 
due process.  Although e-mail is still a developing technology that has its drawbacks, 
this Note argues that courts should find that notice by e-mail satisfies the standards 
of due process that the United States Supreme Court has developed for class action 
notice.  First, this Note establishes that e-mail is a form of individual notice, as 
required by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.12  Second, this Note shows that e-mail 
notice is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action” and “reasonably certain to inform those 
affected” as required by Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.13  Third, this 
Note contends that due process is a flexible concept that allows for considerable 
judicial discretion, which allows room for new methods of transmitting notice.14  
Fourth, this Note argues that e-mail is comparable to first-class mail, which is widely 
accepted as satisfying due process requirements.15  Although e-mail and traditional 
                                                                
9Attorneys are recognizing not only that the Internet is efficient and convenient, but also 
that in the near future their clients will demand that they use the Internet because of the cost 
and time savings.  See, e.g., Richard M. Georges, The Impact of Technology on the Practice of 
Law- 2010, FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 36, 38 (“E-mail is the most popular Internet application, 
and the most used by lawyers, because it enables rapid, efficient communication and file 
sharing with anyone in the world from the lawyer’s desk . . . .  Some lawyers already are 
conducting much of their business over the Internet using e-mail.”); Al Harrison, Delivery of 
Electronic Documents, 60 TEX. B.J. 476, 476 (1998) (“Electronic communications and 
electronic document transfer are rapidly becoming a focal point of modern law practice.”); 
Laura W. Morgan, Attorney-Client Privilege in E-Mail Communications, 10 NO. 5 DIVORCE 
LITIG. 98, 98 (1998) (“Today . . . most lawyers are online and many communicate with other 
attorneys and their clients by e-mail.”); Ron Smith, Lawyers Must Overcome Technophobia, 
Learn to Take Advantage of E-Mail, Net, J.KAN. B.A., Oct. 1996, at 3 (“The main reason that 
sooner or later ‘the ‘Net’ is gonna getcha’ is your sophisticated clients will demand that you be 
an ‘intranaut.’  Time is money, for you and your clients.”); Ron Smith, Postage Up, Email 
Costs Down, J. KAN. B.A., Mar. 1995, at 7 (“Your future legal clients may demand that you 
institute such cost savings as part of representing them.”).  
10Internet users refer to traditional postal mail as “snail mail” because it is slower than e-
mail. 
11Order Approving Class Notice and Directing Distribution Thereof, Fine v. America 
Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. Ct. of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997) 
(“Plaintiffs’ counsel are hereby authorized to transmit the Notice to class members by E-mail 
forthwith.”); Journal Entry, Fine v. America Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. Court 
of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997) (granting order of class notice). 
12417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
13339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
14See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2); see generally Mullane, 339 U.S. at 306. 
15See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3d § 30.211 (1995) 
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mail are different in some respects, this note demonstrates that the differences:  (1) 
are irrelevant for purposes of due process, (2) are small enough that the broad due 
process standards set forth by the Supreme Court are not violated, or (3) will 
diminish as e-mail technology improves.  
Finally, this Note maintains that, from a policy standpoint, e-mail notice may 
actually be better than notice by traditional mail. Because e-mail notice would be 
much cheaper than notice by first-class mail, cost will no longer be an obstacle for 
class action plaintiffs, who must bear the cost of notice under Eisen.  The cost 
savings will not only benefit plaintiffs; defendants, who often bear the cost of notice 
of settlement under Rule 23(e), can benefit by using e-mail as well.  
Presently, e-mail notice is most viable in class actions where only an e-mail 
address is available for the class member, such as in class actions that involve 
Internet activities.16  But as the Internet grows and subscriber rates continue to rise, e-
mail addresses will become as common as telephone numbers and street addresses.  
When that time comes, attorneys will have the choice between sending notice by e-
mail or sending it by first-class mail.  Because of the convenience and cost savings, 
those attorneys will likely choose to send notice by e-mail.  And traditional concepts 
such as due process not only should, but must be adaptable to an online society.  
II.  THE ESTABLISHED RULES GOVERNING CLASS ACTIONS 
A. The Requirements of Rule 23 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the requirements for 
maintaining a class action.17  Subsection (a) sets out the four prerequisites for a class 
action: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.18  A 
class action must then fit into at least one of the three types of classes, described in 
subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the rule.19  This Note focuses only on the 
“(b)(3)” class, which may be maintained when “the court finds that questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”20  As the 
rule’s Advisory Committee’s notes point out, a fraud perpetuated on many people 
through similar misrepresentations is a good candidate for this type of class action.21  
Rule 23 contains three notice provisions that are applicable to (b)(3) classes.  The 
primary focus of this Note is subsection (c)(2), which unambiguously requires notice 
of membership in a (b)(3) class.22  Subsection (c)(2) provides that “[i]n any class 
                                                                
16For example, in class actions involving the provision of online access, or one of the 
many businesses that sell their products online, e-mail addresses would likely be available 
since Internet businesses generally communicate with their customers only by e-mail. 
17FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
18FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
19FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).  
20FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3).  
21FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3) advisory committee’s note. 
22FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2). 
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action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of 
the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”23  The reason 
for mandatory notice in (b)(3) classes, but not in (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes, is that the 
(b)(3) class is the only type of class from which a member can exclude himself or 
herself (“opt-out”).24  Therefore, the rule requires that the notice inform members of 
a (b)(3) class of their rights and options: 
The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the 
member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) 
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do 
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request 
exclusion may, if the member so desires, enter an appearance through 
counsel.25 
The other two notice provisions in Rule 23 are applicable to all class actions, not 
just (b)(3) classes.  Subsection (e) provides that notice is mandatory when any class 
action is dismissed or compromised and must be given “to all members of the class 
in such manner as the court directs.”26  The final notice provision in Rule 23 is 
discretionary.27  Subsection (d)(2) allows the court to order notice as it sees fit 
throughout the litigation “for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise 
for the fair conduct of the action.”28  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make notice an important element of class 
action litigation.  The Rules establish notice as a fundamental element in (b)(3) 
classes, as the mandatory notice provision set out in subsection (c)(2) demonstrates, 
because of the unique opt out rights of (b)(3) class members.  
B.  Due Process Requirements for Rule 23 Notice 
The concept of due process is embodied in both the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution: “nor [shall any person] be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.”29  The fundamental right 
to due process is a primary consideration in all litigation.30  Due process is a critical 
                                                                
23Id.  
24Id.  According to the Advisory Committee’s note, it appears that the reason for opt out 
rights in (b) (3) classes but not in (b) (1) or (b) (2) classes is that the individual’s interest in 
pursuing his or her own litigation is particularly compelling in claims that fall under (b) (3).  
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2) advisory committee’s note; See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3). 
25FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2). 
26FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  
27FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2). 
28FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2).  
29U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
30See Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900) (“That a man is entitled to some notice 
before he can be deprived of his liberty or property is an axiom of the law to which no citation 
of authority would give additional weight.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) 
(“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).    
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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concept in class actions because the judgement will affect the legal rights of the 
members of the action who are not parties.31  Due process concerns are all the more 
compelling in Rule 23(b)(3) classes because of the members’ opt out rights.  Without 
notice of their membership in the action and of their opt out rights, the rights of 
absent class members in (b)(3) classes could be compromised without their control 
or knowledge.  Therefore, notice of the action is critical if members are to receive the 
process they are due.  
The drafters of the Federal Rules paid particular attention to the due process 
implications of class action notice.  The Advisory Committee’s notes for Rule 23 
establish that the Rule’s notification requirements are “designed to fulfill the 
requirements of due process.”32  The drafters relied on two United States Supreme 
Court cases, Hansberry v. Lee and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., in 
formulating the notice requirements to comply with due process requirements.33 
In the first case relied on by the drafters, Hansberry, the United States Supreme 
Court examined the potential res judicata effect of a class action on absent class 
members.34  Although the opinion concerned adequacy of representation as a due 
process requirement in a class action rather than notice, Hansberry was the Court’s 
first decision that set forth the proposition that class actions must meet the due 
process requirements of the 14th Amendment.35  The Court held that the judgment in 
a class action can only be binding on absent class members if due process standards 
are met.36 
The second case relied on by the drafters, Mullane, sets forth the basic due 
process standards that are now applied to class action notice.37  The Court held that 
notice by newspaper publication was constitutionally sufficient for beneficiaries of a 
common trust whose addresses could not be ascertained with due diligence, but was 
insufficient protection for the due process rights of beneficiaries whose addresses 
where ascertainable.38  The Court noted that “[a]n elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding . . .  is notice reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to present the objections.”39  The Court went 
                                                                
31See HERBERT B. NEWBERG AND ALBA CONTE, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.46 
(3d. ed. 1992); PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 34.  The due process rights of 
plaintiff class members are also important to the defendants in the class action so that they 
may have a binding and final judgement that will not be continually subject to attack. See 
NEWBERG at § 8.01. 
32FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2) advisory committee’s note. 
33Id. 
34311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
35Id. at 40-43. 
36Id. 
37339 U.S. 306 (1950).  
38Id. at 318-20. 
39Id. at 314.  In formulating this test, the Court relied on and cited to the case of Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).  In addressing the adequacy of substituted service in acquiring 
personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant, the Court stated that  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss1/7
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on to develop the following test for constitutionally adequate class action notice: 
“The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.  The reasonableness and hence the 
constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is 
in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.”40   
Since the present Rule 23 was drafted in 1966, the United States Supreme Court 
has had the opportunity to elaborate on the due process requirements of notice in 
several cases.  The first case the Court decided after the rule was enacted was Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.41  Eisen has become the primary precedent for the due 
process standards for class action notice in (b)(3) classes.42  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Eisen was the culmination of almost a decade of litigation over whether 
the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) were also the due process standards, with 
several trips back and forth from the district to the circuit court.43  When the case 
finally reached the Supreme Court, in a decision often referred to as “Eisen IV,” the 
Court held that the notice requirements of Rule 23 satisfied due process standards.44  
The Court reaffirmed Rule 23’s mandate that individual notice is the best notice 
practicable for class members whose addresses are identifiable through reasonable 
effort.45  The Court also settled a critical dispute in (b)(3) class actions: who should 
bear the cost of notice.  The Court disapproved of the district court’s attempt to 
allocate costs between the plaintiff class and the defendant, holding that “[w]here, as 
here, the relationship between the parties is truly adversary, the plaintiff must pay for 
the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing the suit.”46  Eisen firmly 
established that due process requires individual notice of membership in a (b)(3) 
class to class members who are identifiable through reasonable effort. 
Two years after Eisen, the Supreme Court addressed (b)(3) notice issues again in 
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.47  In Oppenheimer Fund, the Court seemed to 
back away from the hard line approach to notice issues that it took in Eisen, restoring 
the notion that due process in class actions is a flexible concept.  While the Court 
reiterated that the representative plaintiffs must generally bear the cost of notice, the 
Court clarified that Eisen does not always require that plaintiffs pay all costs incident 
                                                          
[I]t’s adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the 
form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is reasonably 
calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.  
If it is, the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit in due 
process are satisfied.  
Id. at 463 (citation omitted). 
40Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.  
41417 U.S. 156 (1974).  
42NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.03.  
43Id. 
44417 U.S. at 173-75.  
45Id. at 175. 
46Id. at 178-79. 
47437 U.S. 340 (1978). 
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to sending notice.48  The Court held that a district court has discretion under Rule 
23(d) to order a defendant to perform a task necessary to sending notice, such as the 
identification of class members, if the defendant can do it with less difficulty or 
expense than the representative plaintiff.49  By pointing out that “[a] district court 
necessarily has some discretion in deciding . . . how notice should be sent,”50 the 
Court impliedly endorsed the notion that due process in class actions is not a fixed 
and rigid concept, but a flexible one that allows room for a court’s discretion. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent examination of the due process requirements 
for (b)(3) class action notice took place in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.51  In 
holding that due process does not require that out-of-state plaintiff class members 
must affirmatively consent to jurisdiction,52 the Court nicely summarized the due 
process requirements for a binding judgment in a class action.  The Court’s summary 
of due process requirements included five points: 1) “[t]he plaintiff must receive 
notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation;” 2) the notice 
must conform to the “reasonably calculated” standard set forth in Mullane; 3) “[t]he 
notice should describe the action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it;” 4) “due process 
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to 
remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for 
exclusion’ form to the court;” and 5) the named plaintiffs must adequately represent 
the absent class members.53  
The due process standards for class action notice provide a generous amount of 
flexibility.54  With the exception of the Eisen requirement for individual notice to 
class members whose addresses are reasonably ascertainable, the United States 
Supreme Court has refused to set rigid rules for constitutionally adequate class action 
notice.  Instead, the Court has allowed for considerable judicial discretion in class 
actions, subject only to the broad standards of reasonableness set forth in Mullane. 
C.  Traditional Methods of Transmitting Individual Notice 
Absent from both Rule 23 and from the Supreme Court’s due process standards is 
the mandate that individual notice to class members be transmitted by any particular 
means.55  In keeping with the flexibility and discretion that due process standards 
afford, trial courts have approved a number of methods for transmission of notice in 
(b)(3) class actions. Representative litigation presents such a variety of 
circumstances and fact patterns that courts refuse to adhere to any rigid rules for 
sending notice to class members.  
                                                                
48Id. at 356. 
49Id. at 355-56.  
50Id. at 360. 
51472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
52Id. at 811-12. 
53Id. at 812. 
54NEWBERg, supra note 31, at § 8.02.  
55See 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2056 (1996). 
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For individual notice to identifiable class members, first class mail to the 
recipient’s last known address is the traditional method of transmission.56  Notably, 
most courts have not required that the notice be sent by certified or registered mail.57  
Although these methods may be more reliable and more likely to reach their 
recipient, courts find that the expense is unjustified.58    
Courts have allowed for methods of transmission in large classes that are less 
costly than first-class mail, particularly in light of Eisen’s clarification that plaintiffs 
must bear the cost of notice.  One such method is bulk mailing.59  In one particularly 
large class action, the court allowed notice printed on a single-sheet mailer or as a 
postcard.60  Another common method is to include notice in the defendant’s own 
periodic mailings to the class members, such as in monthly statements, billings, or 
pay envelopes.61  The Supreme Court pointed out this cost-effective alternative in 
Oppenheimer Fund.62 
Although the Eisen Court remarked that “[t]here is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest 
that the notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular 
plaintiffs,”63 courts have traditionally given consideration to costs when deciding 
how notice should be delivered to class members.  The discretion given to district 
courts in overseeing notice and the broad standard of reasonableness required by due 
process have allowed courts to be creative in ordering the transmission of notice. 
III.  THE “NUTS AND BOLTS” OF E-MAIL 
The most popular and creative new method of individualized communication is 
electronic mail, more commonly known as “e-mail.”  E-mail is one of many services 
provided on the vast network of interconnected computers known as the Internet.  In 
just the few short years since the Internet and services such as e-mail became 
                                                                
56See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3d, supra note 15, at § 30.211; PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 277; Marcia G. Robeson, Annotation, What Constitutes “Best 
Notice Practicable,” Required by Rule 23 (c) (2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in Class 
Actions Brought Under Rule 23(b) (3), 32 A.L.R. FED. 102 § 4 (1977).   
57See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D. 627, 632-33 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(notwithstanding contention that class members might disregard a first-class letter and pay 
closer attention to a certified letter, mailing notice of class action by first-class mail is 
sufficient); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 416, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“[n]otice need not be sent 
by registered mail.”). 
58See Cayuga Indian Nation, 89 F.R.D. at 632-33. 
59PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 8, at 277.  
60In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
61See Bogosovian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1086 (1978); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).  See also NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.06; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION 3d, supra note 15, at § 30.211.   
62Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 355 n.22 (1978).    
63Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974). 
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accessible to the mainstream public, they are largely responsible for transforming 
America into a highly computer-dependent society.64 
The Internet is not a tangible entity, but rather “a giant network which 
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks.”65  Each of 
the smaller networks is administrated, maintained, and funded by private companies,  
educational institutions, and other organizations.66  An individual computer connects 
to the network through a modem, which dials into one of many central computers in 
the network through traditional telephone lines.67  Although an individual computer 
can access the Internet in a number of ways, many users pay commercial “Internet 
service providers” or “online services” to connect them to the Internet.68  This 
connection enables users to communicate and exchange information in textual, 
audio, and video form.69   
Once an individual connects to the Internet, that individual has access to a variety 
of services.  One popular service is the World Wide Web (WWW), which links 
together information stored on computers connected to the Internet.70 Another 
service, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), is similar to a telephone conversation except that 
the participants type to each other instead of speak to each other; the parties watch 
each other’s words appear on the screen as they are being typed.71  
The most popular service on the Internet is e-mail.72  While the WWW is 
analogous to visiting a library and IRC as analogous to talking on the telephone, e-
mail is analogous to sending a finished letter through the mail.73  In order to send and 
receive e-mail, an Internet user must have an e-mail address.74  Service providers and 
                                                                
64See Pike, supra note 1; see also Communication Upgrade: E-mail is as Popular as Print 
Media, HR FOCUS, May 1995, at 17 (almost 9 out of 10 Fortune 100 corporations use e-mail 
for person-to-person communications); Internet Use Changing U.S. Industry, EDITOR & 
PUBLISHER, Apr. 4, 1998, at 23 (in a survey of senior executives at more than 400 U.S. 
companies, 87% said they personally use the Internet and 98% reported they use it to 
distribute information about their companies; 74% predicted that e-mail will be a key source 
for businesses by the year 2005).  
65American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 
affirmed, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
66JOSHUA EDDINGS, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 13 (1994). 
67DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK 32-33 (2d ed. 1997). 
68American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 833. 
69See id. at 834. 
70DAVID B. WHITTLE, CYBERSPACE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 201 (1997).  The World Wide 
Web contains millions of virtual documents called “web pages.”  Each page contains 
highlighted links (“hypertext”) that, when clicked on by the user’s mouse, connect the user to 
related pages.  See COMER, supra note 67, at 198.   
71American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 835. 
72The number of e-mail boxes worldwide is expected to quadruple in the next two years to 
1 billion.  Jane Hodges, Why These Guys Want to Handle the World’s E-mail, FORTUNE, Feb. 
15, 1999, at 149.  
73See WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51.  
74See COMER, supra note 67, at 146. 
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online services that connect users to the Internet generally provide e-mail accounts 
with e-mail addresses.75  An e-mail address is like a street address but is assigned to 
an individual or an organization rather than a geographic location.76  E-mail 
addresses follow a standardized format: the user’s name or alias, an “@” symbol, 
and the domain.77  The domain is required as part of the Domain Name System 
(DNS), a system of naming the individual networks and computers that make up the 
Internet.78  The domain, like a street address, tells the e-mail provider exactly which 
computer to deliver an e-mail message to.79 
Once a user has an e-mail address, he or she can compose and send textual 
documents through the Internet to other individuals’ e-mail addresses.80  The service 
provider or online service works like the United States Postal Service in delivering 
the e-mail messages to the proper addresses.81  The provider/service stores an e-mail 
message in a central computer until its intended recipient connects to the Internet and 
accesses his or her e-mail account, at which time the provider/service delivers the 
message into the recipient’s e-mail box for the recipient to read.82  Unlike traditional 
mail, which can take days to be delivered, e-mail is delivered almost 
instantaneously.83 
IV.  HOW E-MAIL SATISFIES DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
As Internet usage becomes more popular and the number of individuals with e-
mail addresses grows, individual notice in a (b)(3) class action can be sent efficiently 
and inexpensively by e-mail rather than by first-class mail.  The traditional standards 
of due process do present some obstacles to e-mail notice: there are questions as to 
the practicality and reliability of sending notice by e-mail.  But the flexibility of due 
process and the fact that e-mail technology will continue to improve should make it a 
viable and constitutional avenue for sending notice in the very near future. 
A.  Notice by E-Mail Meets the Eisen Standard of “Individual Notice” 
E-mail notice meets the most fundamental due process standard in class actions: 
the requirement in Rule 23(c)(2) and Eisen of individual notice to class members that 
are identifiable through reasonable effort.84  “E-mail is a personal communication 
                                                                
75Popular services include America Online and Prodigy.  
76See WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51. 
77See id.; see also EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 91-92.  
78EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 91. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. at 82-83. 
82Id. 
83WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51. 
84See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175 (1974). 
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sent directly from one user to another.”85  Each address is attached to a person rather 
than a geographic location.86  Because e-mail is a textual document that is 
“affirmatively directed” at a particular user,87 it is clearly a form of individual notice, 
meeting the due process standard set forth in Eisen. 
One potential problem under Eisen is whether e-mail notice would be the “best 
notice practicable under the circumstances.”88  By requiring the “best” notice 
practicable, the standard can potentially be misconstrued as mandating that only one 
method of sending notice can meet the due process requirements.  However, the 
Eisen Court refused to require that one method of transmission gives the best notice 
practicable, only saying that individual notice was the best notice practicable when 
the members can be identified.89  Following suit, courts have generally recognized 
that individual notice is the best notice practicable, not that any particular method of 
sending that individual notice is always the best notice practicable.90 Largely, courts 
assumed individual notice meant first-class mail because, until the advent of e-mail, 
it was the only method of contacting large numbers of people.   
Those courts that have required that individual notice be sent a certain way, such 
as by first-class mail, have done so not because it is always the “best” notice, but 
because it has been “practicable under the circumstances.”91 First class mail has 
traditionally been practicable under almost all circumstances because street addresses 
of class members are easily ascertainable.  Since e-mail is a form of individual notice 
that is now “practicable,” it can meet the “best notice practicable” standard for 
purposes of due process. 
The more difficult problem that e-mail notice has under the Eisen standard is 
whether class members’ e-mail addresses can be obtained through “reasonable 
effort.”  This is not an issue of due process, but rather an issue of practicability and 
feasibility.  One reason e-mail notice may not be practicable is because many people 
still do not have e-mail addresses.92 Although the number of people with e-mail 
addresses is growing exponentially,93 e-mail addresses are still not as common as 
                                                                
85United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 411 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see also Lockheed Martin 
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (e-mail is a form of 
“one-to-one communication”).  
86WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 51-52. 
87Compuserve Inc., v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997).  
88Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-75. 
89Id.  
90See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977); In re 
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Steiner v. 
Equimark Corp., 96 F.R.D. 603 (W.D. Pa. 1983).  
91See Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Inst., 898 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Ungar 
v. Dunkin’ Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (D.C.Pa.), rev’d on other grounds, (531 
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1975).   
92See John G. Auerbach, Getting the Message, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1997, at R22 (stating 
that 20% of the U.S. population lives in households wired for e-mail). 
93See supra note 67. 
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street addresses.94  Another reason for the problem is that e-mail addresses do not 
automatically include the individual’s full name, making it potentially more difficult 
to find an individual’s e-mail address rather than a street address.95  A third reason 
why e-mail addresses may not be obtainable through reasonable effort is that there is 
no central directory of e-mail addresses.96 
A number of these obstacles have or will have solutions in the near future.  The 
staggering growth rate of e-mail use forecasts that e-mail addresses probably will be 
as common as street addresses in the near future.97  Although e-mail addresses do not 
automatically contain the user’s full name, numerous Internet sites provide free 
“people finders” or “white pages,” in which you type the name of the individual and 
the service will find his or her e-mail address.98  Third, although there is no central 
directory of e-mail addresses, a number of directories do exist.99  The people finders 
and Internet white pages are examples of such directories.100   
                                                                
94See Auerbach, supra note 92. 
95E-mail addresses follow a standard format: the user’s name or alias, followed by an @ 
symbol, followed by the domain (the computer networks through which the message must be 
routed to reach its recipient).  WHITTLE, supra note 70, at 52.  The problem is that many users 
do not include their full name in their address and are not required to do so; therefore, one 
cannot necessarily tell which individual is at an e-mail address by looking only at the address.  
See Id. 
96Netcom Search Frequently Asked Questions <http://in-105.infospace.com/ 
_1_410DUDE0208VLEG_info.netcom/faq2.htm#wp>.  When the Internet was small, a central 
directory was feasible.  EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 105. However, maintaining a central 
database is now impracticable because of the size of the database and the constant changes 
necessary to keep it current.  Id. 
97Although economic factors had been an obstacle for many in getting online, particularly 
because personal computers were expensive, this problem appears to be disappearing.  
Individuals can now gain Internet access in many places without having to buy a personal 
computer.  See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. Pa. 
1996), affirmed, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (many have free access at work; there is also free access 
at libraries and cheap access at coffee shops).  Individuals can also obtain e-mail addresses for 
free.  See MSN Hotmail (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.hotmail.com>. Computer 
systems are steadily dropping in price and a large secondary market now exists.  Although 
Internet use was once a luxury for the upper classes, statistics now show that the demographics 
of the Internet now mirror the demographics of the country’s population. Hoag Levins, Big 
Net News: It’s Not News Anymore, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 1998, at 2. 
98See Netcom US People Finder (visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.netcom.com/ 
whowhere.html>; WhoWhere? People Finder (visited Mar. 29, 1999) 
<http://www.whowhere.lycos.com>.   
99See EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 105.  Similarly, people do not generally use a directory 
of street addresses that includes the addresses of everyone in the United States; traditional 
phone and address directories are regional.  While street address directories are geographically 
regional, e-mail address directories are the virtual equivalent - they are usually regional by 
individual network.  See Id.; see also Netcom Search Frequently Asked Questions (visited 
Mar. 29, 1999) <http://in- 105.infospace.com/_1_410DUDE0208VLEG_info.netcom/ 
faq2.htm#wp>. 
100See Netcom US People Finder, supra note 97; WhoWhere? People Finder, supra note 
97. 
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Application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Oppenheimer Fund, which 
permits a court to order a defendant to perform tasks that will save costs in sending 
notice,101 will perhaps diminish the difficulty in locating an individual’s e-mail 
address more than any of the above alternatives.  As e-mail addresses become more 
common, defendants of class actions will be more likely to have lists of class 
members’ e-mail addresses, which, like street addresses, the court can order the 
defendant to produce.102  
Because of the present problems of practicability, class actions involving Internet 
services or businesses will be the first types of classes were e-mail notice is feasible 
because e-mail addresses of the class members are easily obtainable.  The Fine case 
demonstrates this proposition; Fine is a class action suit against America Online, 
Inc., an Internet service provider, by its monthly subscribers for violation of the Ohio 
Consumer Sales Practices Act and breach of contract.103  As Oppenheimer Fund 
permits, the trial court in Fine ordered America Online to provide the plaintiffs with 
the e-mail addresses of class members.104  
Class action notice by e-mail in (b)(3) classes satisfies the Eisen requirement that 
individual notice is the best notice practicable when individuals and their addresses 
can be obtained by reasonable effort.  The practicability of obtaining the e-mail 
addresses of class members will increase as more people go online and the services 
for finding e-mail addresses improve. 
B.   E-Mail Notice Meets the Mullane Standard Because it is Reasonably 
Calculated to Apprise the Class Members of the Action 
E-Mail notice meets the due process standards set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Mullane.105  Because e-mail is a form of individual notice under Eisen, it is 
“reasonably calculated to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”106  Due process does not 
require actual notice in a class action, and since e-mail is a reliable form of notice, it 
meets the broad standards of reasonableness in Mullane.  
The Mullane standard is primarily concerned with the inadequacies of 
publication notice.107  The Court pointed out that publication notice is quite likely to 
fail in reaching its intended recipients; therefore, it is not “reasonably certain to 
                                                                
101Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356-58 (1978). 
102Id. 
103Class Action Complaint, Fine v. America Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. 
Ct. of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997). 
104Order Approving Class Notice and Directing Distribution Thereof, Fine v. America 
Online, Inc., No. 97CV118102 (Lorain Co. Ct. of Common Pleas Ohio, Feb. 10, 1997) 
(“[D]efendant America Online . . . shall provide to plaintiffs’ counsel the names . . . and user 
E-mail addresses of the members of the class.”). 
105Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
106Id. at 314. 
107Id. at 315-17. 
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inform those affected.”108  Mullane stands for the proposition that while publication 
is not reasonably calculated to reach known class members, individual notice is.109  
Both the Rule 23 Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court in Eisen recognized 
this by citing to Mullane when requiring individual notice.110  Therefore, the 
important distinction made in Mullane is between publication and individual notice, 
not between methods of sending individual notice.111  Because it is a form of 
individual notice, e-mail notice meets the Mullane standard. 
Although e-mail is not absolutely certain to reach its intended recipient, neither 
Mullane112 nor any other Supreme Court decision requires actual notice in a class 
action.113  Due process does not require that class members receive personal service, 
or even certified or registered mail.114  As the Mullane Court pointed out, “[w]e think 
that . . . reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are 
justifiable.”115  The overriding theme of Mullane is reasonableness: the notice must 
be “reasonably calculated” and “reasonably certain” to inform.116  E-mail is a 
reasonably reliable method of individual communication, which is all that Mullane 
requires.  Millions of e-mail messages reach their intended recipients daily,117 the 
sender of each “desirous of actually informing” the recipient of some piece of 
information.  Because e-mail is a form of individual notice that is reasonably certain 
to reach its recipient, e-mail meets the due process requirements for class action 
notice.  
                                                                
108Id.  Mullane does, however, approve of publication when the members of the class are 
not reasonably identifiable because publication is the only method of informing the members 
of the action.  Id.  The due process safeguard in such cases is adequate representation.  See 
also NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 4.46. 
109Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315-17. 
110See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d) (2) advisory committee notes; see Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-75. 
111Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315-17. 
112Id. at 318-19. 
113The Supreme Court’s holding in Phillips Petroleum provided some uncertainty on this 
point because the Court required that “the plaintiff must receive notice.”  Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).  However, the Court did not specifically hold that 
actual notice was required. Id.  Furthermore, the Court cited to Mullane and Eisen, both of 
which allow for notice “reasonably calculated” instead of actual notice.  Id.  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court has not required actual notice. Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 
258, 260 (S.D. Cal. 1988).  
114See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-319.  See also Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D. 
627, 632-33 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d. 1483, 1485-87 
(D.C. Cir. 1992); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litig.,  63 F.R.D. 422, 430 (W.D. Ok. 
1974); 32B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 55 at § 2056; NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.02.      
115Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319. 
116Id. at 314-15. 
117See generally supra note 2.  The reliability of e-mail will be further discussed in Part 
IV.E.1 in comparison with first-class mail. 
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C. Due Process is a Flexible Concept, Allowing Room for  Methods of 
Transmitting Notice Such As E-Mail 
The Supreme Court’s due process/notice jurisprudence leaves no doubt that due 
process is a flexible concept, guided by practicality.  This is one of the reasons why 
district court judges are given discretion in deciding what constitutes proper notice in 
each case.118  That flexibility allows for notice by e-mail in a class action.    
Through Mullane, the Supreme Court established that the standards for due 
process in a class action are flexible.119  As discussed throughout this Note, the broad 
standard of reasonableness that pervades the Mullane opinion leaves considerable 
leeway for different avenues of providing notice.  As the Court stated after setting 
out the requirement that notice be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties 
of the pendency of the action, “[b]ut if with due regard for the practicalities and 
peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met the constitutional 
requirements are satisfied.”120  Where e-mail notice is practical in a particular case, 
Mullane’s due process standards allow for it.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Oppenheimer Fund case 
supports the proposition that flexibility is inherent in the concept of due process.  
Holding that “[a] district court necessarily has some discretion in deciding the 
composition of a proper class and how notice should be sent,”121 the Court created 
the necessary room to allow for class action notice by e-mail. 
The Supreme Court has clearly established that due process is not a fixed concept 
with a rigid set of requirements that must be applied in every single case.  Rather, 
due process is flexible and practical, dependent on the circumstances presented in 
each action.  The fact that the Court has approved of the considerable judicial 
discretion of Rule 23 that allows judges to control the form of notice supports the 
notion that due process in a class action suit is flexible.  Because due process is an 
inherently flexible concept, courts should allow class action notice by e-mail in 
actions in which the e-mail addresses of class members are available or reasonably 
ascertainable. 
D.  E-Mail is Analogous to First-Class Mail, an Accepted Form of Individual Notice 
One of the most persuasive reasons that notice by e-mail meets due process 
standards is that it is comparable to first-class mail, the most widely accepted method 
                                                                
118See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2); Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 360 
(1978). 
119Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15.  
120Id.  In Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962), the Court expanded upon 
Mullane’s flexibility, stating that in Mullane, 
[we] thoroughly canvassed the problem of sufficiency of notice under the Due Process 
Clause, pointing out the reasons behind the basic constitutional rule, as well as the 
practical considerations which make it impossible to draw a standard set of 
specifications as to what is constitutionally adequate notice, to be mechanically 
applied in every situation. 
Id. at 212.  
121Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 360 (1978). 
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of transmitting individual notice.122  The mere name alone, e-“mail,” demonstrates 
the analogy.  Although e-mail and first-class mail are not exactly the same, the 
similarities are so strong that e-mail, like first-class mail, should satisfy due process 
requirements. 
E-mail and traditional mail are so similar because the processes by which they 
are created and sent parallel one another.123  In each, the process begins with the 
creation by the sender of a textual document.124  The sender then “mails” this 
document to an individual at a designated address.125  A carrier, the postal service for 
traditional mail and the online service provider for e-mail, delivers the mail into the 
recipient’s mailbox.126  Both mails wait in the mailbox until the recipient “checks” it, 
at which time he or she can then read the document.127 
From the time e-mail first became known to the public, it has been compared to 
traditional mail.128  Numerous commentators analyzing Internet legal issues — from 
bulletin board operator liability for copyright infringement129 to personal jurisdiction 
based on Internet contacts130 — have followed suit.131 
                                                                
122See supra note 56. 
123See Jim Held, Getting Started with Electronic Mail, MACWORLD, Feb. 1989, at 105.  
124See supra Part III. 
125See supra Part III. 
126See supra Part III. 
127See supra Part III. 
128See Marie Alvich, The Paper Race, HOME OFFICE COMPUTING, November 1988, at 66; 
Jeffrey Bairstow, Electronic Mail, INC. OFFICE GUIDE, 1988, at 73; Electronic Mail: Plain 
Fax, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1987, at 78; Held, supra note 123, at 105. As early as 1982, a 
study by the United States Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment recognized that 
electronic mail would eventually compete with and have a serious impact on the future of the 
United States Postal Service.  Office of Technology Assessment of the Congress of the United 
States, Report, IMPLICATIONS OF ELECTRONIC MAIL AND MESSAGE SYSTEMS FOR THE U.S. 
POSTAL SERVICE (August 1982).  
129See Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the 
Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L.REV. 391, 418 (1995) 
(“’E-mail’ is short-hand for electronic mail, and is similar to traditional mail.”). 
130See Friel, supra note 5, at 311(“E-mail has similarities with conventional ‘snail mail.’”).   
131See Stacy B. Veeder, Electronic Mail and Privacy, JOURNAL OF ACADEMIC 
LIBRARIANSHIP, Mar. 1995, at 123(“E-mail has been compared variously to first-class postal 
mail, telephony, routine office paperwork, and face-to-face communications.”); Frieling, supra 
note 3, at 121; David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems 
and Systems Operator Liability, 12 COMPUTER L.J. 101, 153 (1993) (“Since a major use for 
computer information systems is sending e-mail, it is only sensible to compare such a use to 
the U.S. mail.”); Keith B. Norman, The ASB Home Page: Alabama Lawyers Go On-Line For 
a Wealth of Information, 57 ALA. LAW. 328, 328 (1996) (“First class mail, or snail mail, 
cannot compete with E-mail.”); Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: 
Monitoring and Supporting a New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 471-72 (1998) (“[E]-
mail messages are indistinguishable from snail-mail letters in regard to the elements of 
defamation.”); John T. Soma & Alexander J. Neudeck, The Internet and the Single Document 
Rule: Searching For the Four Corners of the Electronic Paper, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
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Recognizing the similarities, a number of federal courts have recognized e-mail 
as the equivalent of first-class mail. In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 
which includes an extensive and thorough discussion of the technology behind the 
Internet,132 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized that 
e-mail is “comparable in principle to sending a first class letter.”133  In United States 
v. Charbonneau, the federal district court for the Southern District of Ohio stated that 
“[e]-mail is almost equivalent to sending a letter via the mails.”134  
E.  Differences Between E-Mail and First-Class Mail Are Minor in Light of the 
Flexible Due Process Standards and the Improvements in E-Mail Technology  
Although e-mail and first-class mail parallel each other, there are differences 
between the two that are potentially significant for purposes of due process.  The 
biggest differences are in the reliability, security, and appearance of the two forms of 
communication.  However, these differences are either overcome by the broad 
concept of reasonableness that predominates due process, rendered irrelevant for 
purposes of due process, or will diminish as e-mail technology improves.  The 
similarities between the two are compelling enough to overcome the differences so 
that e-mail, like first-class mail, is a constitutional form of class action notice. 
1.  Differences in Reliability 
One difference between e-mail and first-class mail involves issues of reliability.  
If e-mail is significantly less reliable than postal mail, it may not be “reasonably 
certain” under Mullane to inform class members of the action and the opportunity to 
exercise their rights.135  One argument that e-mail is not as “reasonably certain” to 
reach its recipient, and therefore does not meet due process standards like traditional 
mail does, is that the postal service, unlike e-mail providers, will forward an 
individual’s mail when he or she changes addresses.136  Another potential difference 
in reliability has to do with who controls each form of mail: because traditional 
postal mail is authorized by the Constitution,137 protected by statute,138 and 
controlled by the government,139 some could argue that it is more reliable than e-
mail, which is not controlled by one central authority.140 
                                                          
SOC’Y 751, 754 (1996) ([“E-mail allows users to communicate typewritten messages, much 
like postal mail (snail mail), except much faster.”).  
132929 F. Supp. at 830-49. 
133Id. at 834.  See also Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 
440 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing American Civil Liberties Union, 929 F. Supp. at 834). 
134979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
135Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).  
136See Victoria Hall, Return to Sender, HOME OFFICE COMPUTING, Jan. 1997, at 50. 
137U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
13818 U.S.C. § 1702 (1994).  
139David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and 
Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 84 (1993).  
140See id.  
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The problem of forwarding is the strongest argument that e-mail is not as certain 
as first-class mail to reach its intended recipient and therefore does not meet the 
Mullane test.  It is not unusual for e-mail users to change Internet service providers, 
and therefore, e-mail addresses.141  However, most service providers do not forward 
mail; once a user leaves a provider, the user is no longer paying for services and 
therefore the provider has no reason to forward e-mail to a new address.142  
Therefore, if class action notice is sent to an old e-mail address, it is less likely to 
reach the recipient than if the notice is sent by postal mail.  This problem has only 
recently come to light and a number of solutions are being developed.  Several 
companies on the Internet are now offering forwarding services.143  The company 
provides a user with a permanent e-mail address and forwards the user’s mail to the 
user’s current e-mail service provider.144  The problem with this service is the 
possibility that the forwarding service could go out of business or that the customer 
could become unsatisfied and want to change services, in which case the user would 
be right back where he or she started, with an outdated e-mail address.145  Currently, 
the only permanent solution is for users to register their own domain name and only 
use e-mail providers that will host their domain.146 
The difference in forwarding services between e-mail and postal mail is a 
potential problem for purposes of due process in a (b)(3) class action because e-mail 
notice is not certain to reach its intended recipient if he or she has changed e-mail 
addresses.  But the problem is relatively small for three reasons. First, the Mullane 
standard is a broad standard of reasonableness, allowing room for the possibility that 
notice may not reach its destination.147  Although e-mail may not be absolutely 
certain to reach its intended recipient, it is still safe to say that the vast majority of 
messages reach their desired destination, making it “reasonably certain” under 
Mullane that e-mail notice will apprise class members of the action.148  
Second, e-mail is an evolving technology that is improving daily due to the 
competitive nature of the market.  The more consumer demand there is for reliable 
forwarding services, the more eager companies will be to find a solution to the 
problem. 
Third, e-mail makes up for its forwarding deficiencies because it is more reliable 
than postal mail in a number of other ways.  The fact that e-mail is controlled by 
                                                                
141The author has had six different e-mail addresses from 1993 until the time of this 
writing. 
142See Hall, supra note 136, at 50. 
143See Yahoo! Forwarding Services (visited Mar. 29, 1999) 
<http://dir.yahoo.com/Business_and_Economy/Companies/Internet_Services/E-mail_ 
Providers/Forwarding_Services>.  The forwarding services generally charge a monthly or 
yearly rate, although some services will forward for free if the user allows an advertisement at 
the bottom of each message the service processes.  See Hall, supra note 136, at 52. 
144See Hall, supra note 136 at 52. 
145Id. 
146Id. 
147See Hall, supra note 136; Part IV.B. 
148See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
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many different entities may actually make it more reliable than the postal mail, since 
the competition for e-mail users causes service providers to ensure that their services 
are reliable. Also, because e-mail is delivered much more quickly than traditional 
mail, there is less time spent en route, during which traditional mail can be lost.149  
For all practical purposes, individuals and businesses believe e-mail is just as 
reliable as postal mail, if not more so.  Millions of documents that used to be sent by 
mail are now being sent by e-mail, including important documents and 
correspondence.150  If the general public has put its faith in the reliability of e-mail 
delivery in comparison with first class mail, then e-mail notice in a class action 
should, like first class mail, meet the requisite due process standards. 
2.  Differences in Security 
Another difference between e-mail and postal mail is that e-mail may be less 
secure than postal mail.  Internet security has been a subject of much debate.151  As 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pointed out, “unlike postal 
mail, simple e-mail generally is not ‘sealed’ or secure, and can be accessed or 
viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and the recipient.”152  E-mail 
is not in an envelope the way postal mail is, protecting it from outside readers, such 
as service providers.  If e-mail is substantially less secure than postal mail, the two 
mails may be different enough that e-mail should not satisfy due process the way 
postal mail does. 
The answer to the problem is quite simple: the fact that someone else can read a 
user’s e-mail notice really does not matter for purposes of due process in class action 
notice.  None of the due process standards set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court require that the notice be secure from outside readers.153  In fact, if notice is 
published, which due process permits for unlocatable class members, potentially 
millions of people who are not in the class will read the notice.154  Although an 
individual e-mail message, unlike published notice, is connected to an individual, 
                                                                
149See Friel, supra note 5, at 311-12 (“[E]-mail, when sent, gets delivered instantaneously 
to the recipient.”); Tickle, supra note 129, at 394-95 (“E-mail is interactive in nature and can 
involve almost instantaneous communication, more like a telephone than regular mail.”); 
Norman, supra note 131, at 328 (“First class mail, or snail mail, cannot compete with e-mail 
because the message or the message with attached document is delivered instantaneously.”).   
150See Sundstrom, supra note 2, at 2064 (“Electronic mail . . . is rapidly supplementing, 
and often replacing, traditional forms of personal and business communication.”); David E. 
Haddock, As a Matter of Fact, I do Own the Whole Damned Road: Municipal Impediments to 
Advance Telecommunications Services Through Control of the Public Right of Way, 28 PAC. 
L.J. 947 (1997) (“[M]any Americans are more likely to send electronic rather than paper 
mail.”). 
151See Denise Samoriski, et al., Electronic Mail, Privacy, and the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA, 
Winter 1996, at 60. 
152American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
153See supra Part II.B.  
154See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).  
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some courts have allowed individual notice to be sent in forms that don’t protect 
from the uninvited eye, such as on post cards.155   
The fact that an intermediary could read a user’s e-mail does matter in other areas 
of law, particularly regarding the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.156  For instance, the District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio has recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
transmitting e-mail and that police officials cannot intercept e-mail transmissions 
without probable cause and a search warrant.157  But the Supreme Court has not 
identified privacy as an issue for purposes of due process in a class action and e-mail 
security should not be an issue under the traditional due process standards.   
Although not dispositive of the constitutionality of e-mail notice, security 
measures are being developed for e-mail so that it is as secure from the uninvited eye 
as traditional mail.  One such measure is encryption.158  Encryption software 
scrambles the message while it is in transit, then unscramble it once the recipient 
receives it.159  Encryption can be analogized to an envelope for post mail.160  
Furthermore, both forms of mail are protected from interception by statute.161  Postal 
laws protect first-class mail,162 while the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 
1986 protects e-mail.163 
Any differences in security between e-mail notice and notice by traditional mail 
are irrelevant for purposes of due process.  The fact that an intermediary could read 
an e-mail message if it is not sealed has no bearing on the constitutionality of e-mail 
class action notice under the Mullane standard. Therefore, class action notice by e-
mail should satisfy due process requirements, just as first-class mail does. 
3.  Differences in Appearance 
A final difference between e-mail and postal mail that may be material for 
purposes of due process is the difference in appearance between e-mail and postal 
mail.  While postal mail is tangible, e-mail is not.164  E-mail is often considered to be 
                                                                
155See In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
156See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997); United States 
v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996); Sundstrom, supra note 2.  
157Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184. 
158EDDINGS, supra note 66, at 183.  
159Id.  
160See Morgan, supra note 9, at 98.  
161Loundy, supra note 131, at 153-54 (“U.S. mail, or ‘snail mail,’ is governed by a statute 
which gives “regular” mail the same kind of privacy that the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act gives E-mail.”). 
16218 U.S.C. § 1702. 
16318 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1994).  The statutes protect both mails from interception in 
transit and while being stored.  Loundy, supra note 131, at 154. 
164See Salbu, supra note 131, at 472. 
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less formal than traditional mail.165  If postal mail is more tangible and “official” in 
appearance than e-mail, class members might take notice by postal mail more 
seriously and be less likely to disregard postal notice as “junk mail.”  If the 
difference is strong enough, e-mail may not be “reasonably calculated” to reach its 
recipient under the Mullane standard. 
However, any differences between the appearances of e-mail and first-class mail 
are trivial and irrelevant.  It is true that postal mail is tangible while e-mail is not.  
But just as there is no requirement that notice be read to be accurate,166 there is no 
requirement that it be tangible to be accurate either.167  Courts have refused to 
require more “official” forms of notice, such as certified mail, registered mail, or 
service of process, showing that an official appearance does not make one form of 
notice more constitutional than another.168  If the recipient disregards the mail as 
junk mail, that is the fault of the recipient, not the sender; the sender still reasonably 
attempted to apprise the recipient of the action, and due process does not require 
actual notice.169  
Although it is immaterial for purposes of due process, e-mail is evolving to look 
more “official.”  E-mail can be used as an informal method of communication, but 
individuals are also using it to send more formal correspondences as well.170  Tools 
such as scanners and formatting programs such as Adobe Acrobat allow users to 
compose and send an e-mail message that looks exactly like a paper document.171   
Additionally, it is now possible to digitally sign an e-mail document, a further 
method of authentication.172  As with the areas of reliability and security, the 
differences in appearance between e-mail and traditional mail are so minor that they 
should not overcome the many similarities between the two forms of individual 
notice.  E-mail notice, like notice by first-class mail, should meet the due process 
requirements in a class action lawsuit.   
                                                                
165See Ian C. Ballon, How Companies Can Reduce the Costs and Risks Associated with 
Electronic Discovery, 15 No. 7 COMPUTER LAW. 8 (1998).  
166Id.  
167See Salbu, supra note 131, at 472 (“[T]he distinguishing element[] . . . of tangibility [is] 
not [a] meaningful difference[] in regard to the law of defamation.”).  Additionally, if 




170See Samoriski, supra note 151, at 60.  
171A scanner is a machine that attaches to a computer that will scan a document like a 
photocopy; the copy that is saved in the computer looks exactly like the paper version.  Adobe 
Acrobat documents “are created with a portable document form (PDF) that enables documents 
to be electronically published without losing their original textual and design layout.” 
Harrison, supra note 9, at 477.  
172See Bradley J. Hillis, From An Internet E-Mail Directory to a Secure Communications 
Network, PROSECUTOR, Dec. 1998, at 30-31. 
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V.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN CLASS ACTIONS ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO 
ALLOW E-MAIL NOTICE 
Individual notice by e-mail in a (b)(3) class action should meet the due process 
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court for the many reasons set forth in this 
note, the most compelling of which is that e-mail is so similar to first-class mail.173  
But there is one way in which e-mail notice is superior to notice by first-class mail: 
cost savings.174  Because of that cost savings, notice by e-mail will aid class plaintiffs 
in bringing viable claims much more effectively than notice by first-class mail, 
which can sometimes be cost prohibitive.175  Since e-mail notice should meet the due 
process requirements for class action notice and is a much less expensive way to 
transmit notice, it will become the preferred way to send notice, especially in large 
class actions. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen made it clear that cost was not to be a 
consideration in deciding what type of notice is required in a given situation and that 
the representative plaintiffs must bear the cost of notice.176  However, this position 
ignores one of the primary purposes of Rule 23: to allow a method of recovery for 
the small claimant where it would be impracticable for the claimant to sue 
individually.177  If the costs of notice are prohibitive, then potentially meritorious 
claims are extinguished.178  The decision in Eisen has been largely criticized for 
undermining Rule 23 and bringing the end to claims that cannot be brought any other 
way.179  There have even been attempts to amend Rule 23 to allow cost of notice to 
be a legitimate consideration in class actions.180  
                                                                
173See supra Part IV.D. 
174See Frieling, supra note 3, at 121 (“It [e-mail] delivers what mail always promised, and 
never provided: virtually instant communications at any distance, at a very low cost.”); Held, 
supra note 123, at 105 (“Businesses are discovering that E-mail is an excellent way for people 
to communicate quickly, without the interruptions of phone calls or the expense of express 
couriers.”; see Norman, supra note 131, at 328 (“[E]-mail can . . . be less expensive than other 
communication mediums because no paper is used.”).  
175See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).  
176Id. 
177See infra note 180.  
178Id. 
179See Zachary A. Smith, Class Action: State Notification Requirements After Eisen, 8 W. 
ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (1980) (pointing out that the number of class actions brought in federal court 
for the year after Eisen decreased 9.6%); Duane W. Reno, Notice and Due Process in Federal 
Class Actions: A Requiem for Revised Rule 23, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 479, 516 (1975) 
(“The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Rule as requiring that class representatives to bear 
the cost of the notice presently required by the Rule . . . serves to discourage small claimants 
from filing class suits, and further defeats the purposes of the Rule.”); Lucy West Behymer, 
Case Comment, 16 B.C. INDUST. & COMM. L. REV. 254 (1975); Newberg, supra note 31, at 
§ 8.03 (“The consequence of the Eisen II (and ultimately Eisen IV) refusal to weigh cost 
factors as a moderating practicability is the sacrifice of potentially meritorious claims, which 
the court had warned against in the very same breath.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 2d § 1788 at 233-34 (1986) (“The effect of this limitation is 
to make the initiation of class actions more burdensome.”). 
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Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen, attorneys bringing class actions 
have had to work to circumvent the cost allocation mandate.  One avenue, which 
Justice Douglas advocated in his Eisen dissent, has been to break the class down into 
subclasses and try one subclass as a test case first.181  Since the subclass would be 
small, the costs of notice would be diminished.182   
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did take a step back from Eisen’s rigid stance on 
cost allocation with its decision in Oppenheimer Fund.  There the Court held that 
district courts have the discretion to order a defendant to perform tasks, such as 
identifying class members or compiling their addresses, if the defendant can do so at 
less cost than the plaintiff class representatives, as well as discretion to allocate the 
cost of those tasks to the defendant.183  The Court stated that “[it is not] improper for 
the court to consider the potential impact that rulings on these issues may have on the 
expense that the representative plaintiff must bear in order to send the notice.”184  
Both before and after the Oppenheimer Fund decision, attorneys have tried to 
alleviate the costs of notice by including notice in the defendant’s regular 
correspondence with class members.185  Some courts also have allowed costs to be 
paid out of a settlement fund set up in a related or overlapping action.186  
Although the Eisen Court clearly stated that cost should not be a factor in 
deciding what is proper notice in a class action, cost has always been a factor that 
even the Supreme Court has considered, even if only subconsciously.  In Mullane, 
the Court refused to require personal service, citing expense as one reason.187  The 
sheer fact that the Court has not required actual notice and has never required that 
notice be sent by certified or registered mail rather than first-class mail also 
demonstrates that the Court impliedly considers cost a factor in deciding what 
method of notice satisfies due process requirements.188 
Class action notice by e-mail is an excellent answer to the problem of notice 
costs, especially in large class actions. Notice by e-mail would not involve the costs 
of paper, printing, and postage incurred from notice by traditional mail.  The only 
                                                          
As mentioned in Part II.B of this note, Eisen was the product of many years of litigation 
and several trips up and down through the federal judicial system.  At one point, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York had allowed for allocation of the 
cost of notice to the defendant of a large class action if the plaintiff could show a strong 
likelihood of success on the merits. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 269-71 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev’d, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).  
180See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 42 (1996). 
181Eisen, 417 U.S. at 179-186 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Robeson, supra note 56, 
at § 2b. 
182Eisen, 417 U.S. at 179-86. 
183Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356-58 (1978).  
184Id. at 360. 
185See supra note 61. 
186See NEWBERG, supra note 31, at § 8.06. 
187Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1950). 
188See supra note 111-12. 
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costs for e-mail notice would be the monthly online service fee, generally less than 
twenty dollars, and any labor needed to compile the class list and type in the e-mail 
addresses.  In the Eisen case, postage costs alone for the class of at least 2,250,000 
class members189 would be $742,500 at today’s first class postage rate.190  Notice by 
e-mail would save a tremendous amount of money, especially if the class attorneys 
can obtain the names and e-mail addresses of class members from the defendants 
under Oppenheimer Fund. 
The cost savings of e-mail notice would not just benefit (b)(3) plaintiffs, but also 
defendants of class actions as well. Costs of notice in a (b)(3) class action can be 
allocated to the defendant as part of a settlement agreement.191  The notice required 
by Rule 23(e), which applies to all 3 types of classes, is often paid for by defendants 
as part of settlement as well.192  Although Rule 23(e) is silent as to the due process 
requirements for settlement notice under the rule, most courts hold that the 
requirements for certification notice, under 23(c)(2), including individual notice, also 
apply to 23(e).193  Therefore, defendants of class actions as well as plaintiff class 
members would benefit from the cost savings of notice by e-mail. 
Although, as the Eisen decision makes clear, rights should not be sacrificed for 
the sake of cost, cost has traditionally been a factor in formulating due process 
requirements and in deciding how individual notice must be sent to members of 
(b)(3) class actions.  And since notice by e-mail does meet the requirements of due 
process, class members’ rights would not be sacrificed for cost.  Additionally, e-mail 
notice best advances the policy behind Rule 23 of allowing an avenue for the small 
claimant to obtain relief.  The tremendous cost savings of sending notice of a class 
action by e-mail rather than by traditional mail is a compelling reason why district 
court judges should seriously consider allowing individual notice to be sent by e-
mail when it is practicable. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the last decade, American society has entered the computer age.  With the 
tremendous growth of the Internet and the popularity of services such as e-mail, 
Americans are increasingly becoming dependent on an entity that will soon become 
an integral part of Americana.  With this new entity, as with any new invention, 
comes adjustments.  As the District Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces noted: 
New technologies create interesting challenges to long established legal 
concepts.  Thus, just as when the telephone gained nationwide use and 
acceptance, when automobiles became the established mode of 
transportation, and when cellular telephones came into widespread use, 
now personal computers, hooked up to large networks, are so widely used 
                                                                
189Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175. 
190The present first-class postage rate is thirty-three cents. 
191See Millstein v. Huck, 600 F.Supp. 254, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
192MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 3d, supra note 15 at 227. 
193Id.; see also Kevin D. Hart, Annotation, Propriety Of Notice of Voluntary Dismissal or 
Compromise of Class Action, Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
52 A.L.R. FED. 457 (1981). 
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that the scope of the Fourth Amendment core concepts of “privacy” as 
applied to them must be reexamined.194 
Soon that day will come for the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment concepts of 
due process as well.  When that day does come, courts should not hesitate to allow 
individual notice of a class action to be sent by e-mail.  E-mail meets the most 
stringent due process requirement for class action notice, individual notice,195 and fits 
well into the reasonableness standards of Mullane and the flexibility that due process 
has traditionally allowed.196  Most importantly, e-mail is the functional equivalent of 
first-class mail, as millions of Internet users already recognize.197  Although there are 
some differences between the two, those differences are either irrelevant for 
purposes of due process or will be extinguished as the young technology of e-mail 
develops.198 
Additionally, notice by e-mail will further the policy behind class action 
litigation and Rule 23(b)(3).  If the costs of notice are prohibitive, and sometimes are 
when notice is sent by first-class mail, then potentially meritorious claims are 
extinguished because they are too small to bring individually.199  Where e-mail meets 
due process requirements and is much less expensive than any other form of 
individual notice, courts should not only be ready, but eager, to allow notice by e-
mail in order to give full effect to the purpose behind class action litigation.   
E-mail could revolutionize not only notice in a class action, but the very nature of 
class litigation itself.  Just as class attorneys could send notice of opt out rights by e-
mail rather than postal mail, class members could exercise their opt-out rights by e-
mail.200  Contact between class counsel and absent class members may no longer be 
limited to a notice of certification and a notice of settlement.  Class counsel could 
keep class members informed of activity in the suit conveniently and at almost no 
cost by creating a list of their e-mail addresses and forwarding one message to all 
members with a click of the mouse.201   
                                                                
194United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 410 (C.A.A.F. 1996).  
195See supra Part IV.A.  
196See supra Part IV.B and IV.C.  
197See supra Part IV.D.  
198See supra Part IV.E.1, IV.E.2, and IV.E.3. 
199See supra note 180. 
200If courts do allow opt outs by e-mail, class members may be more likely to exercise 
their opt out rights because e-mail is so convenient. One possible effect of the increase of opt 
outs is that more classes will be decertified.  The potential ramifications of allowing class 
members to opt out by e-mail are beyond the scope of this Note; however, since it is likely that 
the number of class actions brought will increase due to the cost savings of sending notice by 
e-mail, the author suggests that the increase in opt outs and decertifications will be a valuable 
way of weeding out cases that should not be brought as class actions.  
201This would be especially easy because a list of class members would already be 
available from sending the (c) (2) notice; that list can be saved in the attorney’s e-mail 
software and be accessed whenever necessary with almost no effort.  
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The major obstacle to class action notice by e-mail at present is not the 
Constitution, but practicality.202  Although millions of individuals do use e-mail, the 
numbers show that it is still far from a household staple.203  However, what is most 
important is not the number of current users, but the growth rate, which no one can 
deny is exponential.204  It is only a matter of time before e-mail is as common as 
traditional mail and e-mail overtakes “snail” mail as the preferred method of 
transmitting individual notice in a 23(b)(3) class action. 
JENNIFER MINGUS205 
                                                                
202See supra pp. 19-21.  
203See supra note 2.  
204See Hodges, supra note 72. 
205The author wishes to thank her advisor, Professor Phyllis Crocker, for her guidance and 
help.  The author also wishes to express her gratitude to her family for their unconditional 
support and love through many years of schooling. 
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